Thinking About Iran

Thomas R. Pickering and John Newhouse

The Washington Post, January 1, 2004

Iran is creating an option to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. But whether it actually does so will depend on how the United States and other governments deal with the issue. Possessing these weapons is not Iran's highest priority even if, since the time of the shah, it has been moving on and off in that direction. But the program does reflect Iran's enduring sense of insecurity.

Iran's larger interest lies in becoming a strategic pivot, a stabilizing force in a region that badly needs one. Most of its western border lies against Iraq, where the problems are painfully obvious. Iran's neighbors to the east -- Pakistan and Afghanistan -- are the most troubled and unstable parts of this most unstable of regions. To the north, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia have their own instability. And Turkey to the west is constantly surrounded by problems. The Gulf Arab states fear the bulk and power of Iran.

Iran's reformist bloc by and large understands the risks of acquiring nuclear weapons and the benefits of exercising restraint. And there are signs that elements identified with the extremist clerics who control the levers of power, such as Libya's Moammar Gaddafi, also recognize that neither the country's security nor its position in the world would be served by taking that step. Indeed, crossing this red line would provoke not just the United States but also European governments that have been in the lead in pressing Iran on the issue. Iran's laggard economy would suffer greatly if its trade with these and other governments were put under sanctions by the U.N. Security Council. The country faces a serious demographic problem: a youthful population troubled by widespread unemployment. The economy is the pivotal issue; continuing to move toward nuclear weapons would put it under heavy strain. Moreover, the step would arouse other regional players -- Israel first and foremost, but also Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. We cannot exclude an escalating rush by some Middle East states to emulate Iran's example, if only for "defensive" reasons.

The question of whether to cross the nuclear threshold is, for Iran's leadership, a matter of finding a balance between the pluses and minuses. If the regime sees the country threatened by the instability (or intentions) of its neighbors and by the Bush administration's open advocacy of regime change in Tehran, it is more likely to go forward. Hence, the administration should agree to work with other governments to tilt that balance to the minus side. Together they should agree on steps aimed at strengthening Iran's security and internal stability.

But first they should also continue to discourage Iran's apparent intention to develop an independent nuclear fuel cycle with the purported goal of achieving energy independence -- a patently disingenuous rationale for the program. The United States and others ought to test Iran's intentions by broaching an alternative. They could, for example, assure Iran a continuing supply of fuel and a willingness to take back spent fuel from a nuclear state such as Russia, and lift their objections to Iran's expansion of its reactor program. In return, Iran would halt development of the fully independent fuel cycle and, in particular, suspend its uranium enrichment program unambiguously and under thorough inspection. Iran began to meet one condition for receiving help with its reactor program when, on Dec. 18, it signed on to an additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at improving detection of covert efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

At another level, security arrangements covering the Persian Gulf could be taken up with Iran by its neighbors, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and through the United Nations. These talks could lead first to a Security Council resolution guaranteeing Iran's territorial integrity. In return, Iran would be required to remain in full compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And Iran would further be expected to end its support of groups that advocate terrorism and obstruct the peace process with Israel.

Iran's reformist government might be willing to meet those conditions; it has favored limiting Iran's role in the Middle East conflict to moral and ideological support for the Palestinians. But whether the hard-line clerics agreed would doubtless depend on what they could get in return. Supporting Iran's application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a step that should carry weight. Moreover, the lengthy process involved in applying for membership would create transparency; it would oblige Iran either to begin ridding itself of the corrupt practices that inhibit its economic reforms or reveal them to the WTO and its members.

A Security Council guarantee for Iran would at some point have to be matched by a guarantee to an Iraqi government and other Gulf states against the possibility of aggression from Iran. Indeed, the guarantees should become steps in a sequential process aimed at building a solid security structure for the Persian Gulf. Any such structure could become a model for similar multilateral arrangements in Northeast Asia, where the problems are troublingly similar, albeit different in history, scope and detail.

In thinking about Iran, Washington should take account of Tehran's capacity for making life uncomfortable and messy for the United States and its allies in Iraq (as well as the helpful role Iran seems to be playing there now). U.S. forces are already overstretched on the ground and would be unable to do much about Iran-based troublemaking if the hardliners chose that course.

Awaiting regime change in Tehran, or expecting it, amounts to an attitude, not a policy. The United States, together with major allies and other governments, needs to develop a policy that responds to our interests and, wherever possible, to Iran's as well. (The aftermath of the earthquake in Bam would seem a good time to speak with Iran.) Where these interests coincide, we believe there are opportunities.

Thomas R. Pickering is a former undersecretary of state for political affairs. John Newhouse, a senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information, is author of "Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the World Order."