

Global Challenges for the Next President

Scope Paper #2

February 9, 2007

Casimir Yost

Project Director

(yostc@georgetown.edu)

- The central challenge facing the next U.S. president will be to fundamentally reshape America's role in the world given existing and emerging realities. These "realities" include:
 - a very fluid geopolitical environment, with relatively few firm U.S. allies,
 - a fast deteriorating U.S. position in the Middle East,
 - expanding anti-American "hedging" on the part of larger powers like Russia and China and medium powers like Iran and Venezuela,
 - historically low international approval for U.S. policies,
 - generally weak multilateral/regional organizations, and
 - fresh challenges to existing security regimes (i.e. NPT).
- In the words of a former senior U.S. intelligence official, "The U.S. position has never been weaker in many parts of the world, both in terms of intangibles like prestige and 'standing' and in terms of harder and more concrete problems. What will it take to regain our balance, momentum, and influence?"
- The next U.S. president must find a better equilibrium between reactive American policies of recent years and the imperative for creative leadership to address contemporary challenges. (Note: the "greatest generation" not only responded successfully in World War II to the Axis threat but also helped build the international and national institutions that were central to American foreign policy success after 1945.)
- This paper will:
 1. Briefly review evolution of U.S. geopolitical position – post-1992.
 2. Summarize emerging forces that are circumscribing American power.
 3. Identify the fundamental challenges that will face next U.S. president.

(I) Evolution of U.S. position

- With the end of the Cold War the U.S. lost both its major military (Soviet Union) and coincidentally its major economic (Japan) rivals. It also lost, for a time, a rival ideology to free market economics and democratic politics. It became "indispensable" and "the sole superpower." It was the ally of choice. The U.S. market provided the engine for unprecedented global economic growth.
- By the end of the 1990s the United States – despite its overwhelming military and economic power – was not getting its way on issues U.S. leaders defined as critical. Mistakes made by both presidents Bush '41 and Clinton came back to haunt their successor. The U.S. gained relative power in the 1990s but was losing influence by the end of the decade as demonstrated by the challenges that worsened – WMD proliferation with the additions of

Pakistan and India to the nuclear club, terrorism with the mounting threat posed by al-Qaeda and Palestinian-Israeli peace, which became more elusive after 2000.

- Domestic critics claimed that American power was being misapplied on fuzzy “nation building” priorities and sapped by ineffective presidential leadership. More thoughtful observers debated the applicability of American power to emerging challenges which increasingly appeared within states rather than between states.
- 9/11 exposed an unanticipated, unimagined American vulnerability to external attack.
- The post-9/11 U.S. response – particularly in demonstration wars of choice in Afghanistan and Iraq – exposed not only the limitations of American influence – the contrast to the broad and robust 1991 Gulf War Coalition was stark – but the limitations of American power particularly when that power is ineffectively utilized.
- At the end of 2006 the United States faced the prospect of a strategic reversal in the Middle East, the rise of petro-dollar enhanced regional rivals (Venezuela, Russia, Iran), an emerging competitive ideology in the Muslim world in militant Islam and growing resistance at home to the direction and priorities of American foreign policy. By any measure – the U.S. position in the world is relatively weaker today than a decade ago. Richard Haass goes so far as to suggest “an early end to the era of American primacy in the Middle East and the emergence of a region far more likely to do damage to itself, the United States, and the world.”(1)

(II) Emerging Realities

What is becoming clear is that the overall international strategic situation in which we had unchallenged hegemony for the first decade and a half, the unipolar moment is now over. We are seeing on the horizon the rise of something that is always expected in any unipolar era, which is an alliance of others who oppose us. Charles Krauthammer(2)

- The next U.S. president must confront new realities and anticipate those yet to come. Policy will have to be made in an increasingly complex and fluid geopolitical environment. This new period will be very different than the Cold War with its built-in rigidities and a defined and rather ponderous enemy. Indeed, in contrast to that period, the prospects for a new major power conflict appear minimal. It will be different than the 1990's when the United States took a semi-holiday from serious focus on national security issues. It will even be different from the immediate post-9/11 period when every problem was perceived by some to have a military solution.
- Power is becoming more defuse. The United States, with its vast military and economic resources, remains predominant but not dominant. Our military might is being fought to a draw or worse in one relatively backward nation. Our economy is undergoing wrenching

adjustments as it continues, in the aggregate, to perform well with low inflation and steady growth.

- David Ignacius, writing about a recent speech by British Prime Minister Tony Blair observed, “Blair tried to address the crucial disconnect of the modern world – between a global economy that is seamlessly integrated and a global political system that is broken and ineffective. How can institutions be fixed so that the overriding problems of the 21st century, such as a climate change, poverty in Africa and the conflicts in the Middle East, can actually be solved?”(3)
- Our government – like “government” generally – cannot respond effectively to the rapidity of private sector change which is driven by previously unimaginable technological progress. Government’s capacity to satisfy popular aspirations – stimulated by the communications revolution – is diminishing. Everywhere citizens are unhappy with the performance of their governments.
- The seeds for a more pluralistic, globalized world were laid with largely American initiated and led private sector innovations. The technological/communications revolution of the 1980's and 1990's was assisted by government removal of barriers (NAFTA/WTO), but the primary impetus was non-governmental.
- Globalization has produced winners and losers, good guys and bad. Owners of capital have gained but gains for workers have been uneven in industrialized countries, including the United States. Stephen Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley, points out that over the last decade real labor incomes in the U.S. have grown at roughly half the rate of labor productivity.(4)
- The communications/transportation revolutions facilitated the free movement of information, money, and people. Production networks stimulated global commerce. Global trade grew exponentially. There was a dramatic improvement in the lives of those associated with that trade. Lawrence Summers noted recently that “the world economy in aggregate grew more during the last five years than in any five-year period since the second world war.”(5)
 - We are in an era of massive movements of people – out of fear or in search of opportunities. From one to two millions Iraqis have fled conflict and taken up residence in neighboring countries with uncertain political implications for those host countries. Europe and the U.S. are being transformed by surging legal and illegal immigrants. Europe has a growing, poorly assimilated Muslim population while Hispanics are the fastest growing minority in the U.S.
- There has also been a significant and developing shift in the locus of economic power. A September 2006 special report of the Economist noted “last year the combined output of emerging economies reached an important milestone: it accounted for more than half of total world GDP, (measured in purchasing power parity.)”(6) Technology has destroyed jobs in developed and developing countries. It facilitated not only global commerce but global

terrorism. George Packer, writing in the New Yorker, quotes an Australian counter-terror expert, David Kilcullen, as saying: “If bin Laden didn’t have access to global media, satellite communications, and the Internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave.”(7)

- In some regions of the world it is unclear that free market economics and democratic governance are in the ascendancy. In China and other socialist states economic change is not being accompanied by political change. In parts of the Islamic world, there is a fundamental battle between forces of modernity and more traditional, religious communities. In the Middle East secular authoritarian and democratic politicians are challenged by surging religious forces.
- The emerging reality is a world in which American preferences and norms are likely to be increasingly challenged. The American “message” – whatever it may be – is increasingly unwelcome. Too many are convinced – whatever we may believe about our benign global leadership role – that U.S. policies are only intended to serve America’s narrow interests. Many Muslims resent our questioning their social norms. We are widely viewed as a source of humiliation, not leadership. Many Muslims feel a deep rage at their own leaders, at the West, and at the U.S. in particular. It is hardly surprising that Iraq’s authoritarian neighbors should be opposing our announced goal to “transform” the region. They fear being on the losing end of this transformation. The U.S. democracy agenda – pursued as it was in Iraq – is widely suspect.
 - The factor further complicating the prospects for peace and stability within the Middle East is the Sunni/Shia split within Islam (and indeed within these sects) being played out in bloody sectarian violence in Iraq and in rising Sunni fears of an ascendant Iran.
 - Robert Kaplan argued recently, “the debacle in Iraq has reinforced the realist dictum, disparaged by idealists in the 1990’s that the legacies of geography, history and culture really do set limits on what can be accomplished in any given place.”(8)
- A U.S. strategic failure in the Middle East will empower critics of America but staying the course is sapping American power. Our national dialogue about Iraq fails to capture the full range of geopolitical tradeoffs associated with our choices.
- Looking forward, we and the world are on the cusp of significant economic changes with potentially disruptive consequences. The World Bank 2007 report entitled “Global Economic Prospects – Managing the Next Wave of Globalization”, points to: “the growing economic weight of developing countries in the international economy,” the “potential for increased productivity that is offered by global production chains,” and the likely “accelerated diffusion of technology.” Taken together these shifts will fundamentally rebalance global economic power but they will also, in the judgment of the report’s authors, facilitate growing inequality, pressures in labor markets and what the report refers to as “threats to the global commons.” The report warns specifically of dangers from climate change, infectious disease, and “at risk” fisheries.(9)

- There is also the risk of political “pushback” against forces of globalization. A recent article in Foreign Affairs, entitled “Has Globalization Passed its Peak?” by Rawi Abdel and Adam Segal argues that the “institutional foundations of globalization – such as the rules that oblige governments to keep their markets open and the domestic and international politics that allow policymakers to liberalize their economies – have weakened considerably in the past few years.”(10)

(III) Challenges for the Next Administration

- Challenges will come in several different categories – (1) the inherited immediate and unavoidable “inbox”, (2) the unwelcome early “surprise”, (remember Tiananmen, Black Hawk Down, EP 3, and 9/11) and (3) the longer term challenges that might be ameliorated by early action. Inevitably, the first two will receive significant attention and the last relatively little.

The “Inbox”

- Every new administration inherits foreign policies and commitments from its predecessor. An incoming president must accept, reject, or reshape inherited policies and commitments. The Bush ‘41 “legacy” included an Iraq that had been bloodied but not tamed, an explosive situation in the Balkans that he and his colleagues largely ignored and a Somalia commitment made in the closing days of the administration. The Clinton Administration’s “legacy” to the Bush Administration included two newly declared nuclear weapons states, a failing Dual Containment policy in the Persian Gulf region, a Middle East peace process that had run its course, and an emerging terrorist threat.
- The “inheritance” the next administration receives from the current Bush Administration will include expanded U.S. global military commitments and one or more of the following:
 1. Strategic failure in the Middle East, with the U.S. severely constrained by its continuing commitments to a chaotic Iraq, no positive movement on Palestinian/Israeli peace, an emboldened and nuclearizing Iran, and the overthrow of one or more regional “friends” of the U.S. as refugees and violence radiate from Iraq. Richard Betts reminds us “too many enthusiasts for persistence in Iraq forget one simple point: just because failure is unthinkable does not mean success is possible.”(11) The Bush Administration would have benefited from recalling the warning offered by George Ball in 1964 with respect to Vietnam, “what we might gain by establishing the steadfastness of our commitments we could lose by erosion of confidence in our judgments.”(12)
 - There is little evidence that the Bush Administration is doing sufficient systematic contingency planning for a future U.S. role in a dismembered Iraq or how we should best position ourselves for the widening Islamic schism.

- In the circumstances the U.S. will be less influential in a region of vital importance to our interests. In 2007 our friends in the region – if not necessarily their publics – sought our leadership but did not appreciate our baiting of Iran and Syria. The next administration may be confronted with the task of managing catastrophic failure in Iraq, in Lebanon, and between Palestinians and Israelis where the land for peace trade-off may no longer be a realistic possibility.

2. Other regions will each present special challenges for future U.S. policy makers. These include China and India's rising weight in Asia, a Europe less tethered to American policy and more dependent on uncertain Russian and Middle East energy supplies, a Latin America disgruntled by sustained U.S. neglect, and an Africa "in play" with Chinese and others seeking influence and secure access to energy and other raw materials.

- The Bush Administration managed to have better relations with India and Pakistan and with Japan and China than either of these historic antagonists had with each other. This is a positive legacy to build on.

3. The next administration is likely to inherit a Bush failure to stop either the North Korean or Iranian nuclear programs. The U.S. has gone from a refusal to permit the North Korea program to a refusal only to permit its export. (Positive hopeful noises coming out of U.S./DPRK negotiations in February 2007 give some reason for hope.) The Iranian program appears on track to ultimate detonation. In both cases, force seems off the table and multilateral approaches have thus far come up short. The proliferation challenge may have been made worse by the U.S. – India nuclear cooperation agreement which, in George Perkovich's words "abandoned a long-standing international approach to non-proliferation that prohibited nuclear cooperation with any states that do not apply international safeguards on all their nuclear facilities." (13) This potential downside, of course, has to be balanced against the upside of a strengthened U.S./India relationship.

- The next administration will face similar choices as previous administrations with respect to would-be nuclear states – whether or not to utilize force or diplomacy, whether to engage bilaterally or multilaterally, whether or not to "live with" new members of the nuclear club and, perhaps most challenging, how to prevent the diversion of fissile materials to other states and non-state actors.

4. There is, of course, the possibility (probability) of a major terrorist incident between now and January 2009 in either Europe or the United States. The U.S. remains ambivalent about the nature of the enemy and the proper mix of policy tools to forestall a future attack. We continue to focus on terrorism as an existential threat rather than as a tactic. In the meantime, terrorists are more dispersed, more "homegrown", more experienced, and more lethal than a few years ago. There is a terrorist safe haven, and it is in Pakistan but there is also

growing concern that terrorists may be breeding in the disgruntled Muslim populations of Europe.

5. Finally, there is the ever-present possibility of a sharp down-turn in the U.S. economy arising out of a terrorist incident, a significant rise in oil prices, or panic selling of dollar assets leading to a decline in the value of the dollar and a surge in U.S. interest rates.

- The Bush foreign policy legacy is therefore not a positive or happy one. Opportunities in the Middle East were squandered. The Administration was not known for engaging in rigorous cost benefit analyses of its foreign policy choices or for anticipating problems with its policy choices. The Administration had ideological resistance to exploring negotiated solutions to differences which involved face to face meetings with rogues and enemies. (In stark contrast, the Nixon Administration “normalized” relations with the Peoples Republic of China – the major supporter of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.) As a result, President Bush was constantly confronted with unattractive choices between force on the one hand and ineffective multilateral diplomacy on the other. Old fashioned bilateral diplomacy, vigorously pursued, was out of fashion for the first five or six years of the Bush administration. Festering problems worsened.

Longer Term Challenges

- A central tenet of American foreign policy, through successive administrations has been to prevent a single hostile state or combination of hostile states from controlling a region of strategic importance to the United States. During the Cold War this meant opposing the spread of Soviet, and to a lesser extent, Chinese power. Today, Russia is exerting influence on its “near abroad” and Venezuela, Iran, and China are all active in their respective regions. The next administration will have to come to grips with the challenges posed, by these rising powers, to U.S. interests.
- The next U.S. president will have to be as or more concerned with state weakness and the state and non-state actors that feed on that weakness. The Bush Administration recognized this emerging reality in its 2002 National Security Strategy but was hesitant and ultimately unable to formulate a successful approach to building state capacity beyond swinging our military and economic might. In 2006 the Administration was actually cutting assistance to Afghanistan as the al Qaeda/Taliban threat to that fragile country worsened. The next administration will have to do better or see spreading chaos in regions of vital U.S. interest.
- The next president will have to focus on the dilemma that American soldiers are continually being thrust into internal wars – Panama, Haiti, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq – and will in the future. These are insurgencies or civil wars. Counter insurgency doctrine says that fighting these wars is less about killing the enemy and more about protecting the population and rebuilding state capacity. These tasks are 80% political and 20% military. But the U.S. is spending \$600 billion on its military capabilities and \$35 billion on its State Department and international programs. The resource/mission disconnect is obvious and

debilitating. In early 2007 the U.S. is unable to promptly send funds to Lebanon's government at a time of desperate need because those funds are tied up in the cumbersome Congressional appropriations process.

- Our challenge is exacerbated by the political weakness of so many of the leaders the U.S. is committed to in the Middle East/South Asia: Musharaff, Karzai, Al-Maliki, Abbas, and Siniora.
- At the state level there is the need build positive relations with pivotal Tier I states – the EU, India, Mexico, Brazil, Japan and South Africa. It will mean repairing friendships “at risk” – Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria and South Korea. It will mean formulating fresh approaches to emboldened regional troublemakers – Iran and Venezuela and isolated and failing autocracies such as Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Burma. Russia and China are special cases with competitive and cooperative features to our bilateral relations. Both are evidencing greater assertiveness resulting from growing wealth, diverging interests, and U.S. preoccupation with Iraq.
- At present, too many states neither admire nor fear America. Our relationships are with elites disconnected from the dominant views of their restive populations. Our values-laden policies on proliferation and democratization are broadly viewed as deeply hypocritical or, in the case of the Middle East, as fundamentally threatening. In point of fact, U.S. priorities have been widely viewed as diverging from those of many of our friends since the early days of the Bush Administration. Recent polling found that:

The global view of the United States' role in world affairs has significantly deteriorated over the last year according to a BBC World Service poll of more than 26,000 people across 25 countries. The poll shows that in the 18 countries that were previously polled, the average percentage saying that the United States is having a mainly positive influence in the world has dropped seven points from a year ago – from 36 percent to 29 percent – after having already dropped four points the year before. Across all 25 countries polled, one citizen in two (49%) now says the US is playing a mainly negative role in the world.(14)

Our response has been to focus on how better to communicate our “message” when it has been U.S. policies which so many have found objectionable. Polling data demonstrates the colossal failure of U.S. public diplomacy efforts and the deep international public opinion hole from which the next administration will have to climb.

- Reversing our slide will be particularly challenging because U.S. embassies in many countries have become virtual fortresses severely limiting the actual contact between our diplomats and host populations. By definition our embassy reporting is suffering. America risks becoming disconnected from new realities at least at the official level.
- U.S. economic strength has traditionally been a source of influence for the United States. The world economy has long depended on access to the U.S. market. This dependency may

be shifting with the significant rise in intra-regional trade in Asia and elsewhere. China is, for example, the biggest trading partner for most or all Asian countries.

- There is now a debate over whether U.S. deficits (fiscal and trade) represent a significant vulnerability. Some argue that in fact it is the holders of U.S. dollar assets, (notably the Chinese and Japanese), that are vulnerable because they have a continuing stake in the strength of the American economy and do not have good alternatives to dollar denominated reserve instruments. The Congressional Research Service points out that “Foreign investors now hold more than 55% of the publicly-held and traded U.S. Treasury securities.”(15)
- Others maintain that it is the U.S. that may be at risk, forced to keep rates up to attract foreigners to dollar assets, forced to pay increasing interest costs on its growing debt (\$260 billion or 9% of President Bush’s 2008 budget) and its economy vulnerable to a sudden shock if confidence in the dollar plummets. Alternatives to U.S. dollar assets are emerging. Reportedly the Euro has displaced the dollar as the currency of choice in international bond markets – for the second year in a row.
- A general point about American consumption is worth making because it speaks to a significant challenge facing the incoming administration.
 - Successive administrations have not done well at curbing the demands of the American people – for illegal drugs, illegal immigrants, external financing and imported energy. In each of these areas policy makers have chosen the politically safer approach of focusing on supply issues rather than curbing demand. This has meant trying to curb drug production in Columbia and Afghanistan, erecting fences on our southern border to keep out illegals, attracting foreign capital to finance our consumption, and expanding energy imports.
 - Today, therefore, 4.6% of the world’s population consumes 25% of the world’s annual petroleum production. The U.S. current account deficit hit \$900 billion last year – 7% of our GDP. Our country is flooded with illegal aliens who find jobs.
 - It is not surprising that there is a growing politically divisive trade debate in America – in the face of mounting deficits – between free traders and fair traders. Economists point to low savings rates in the U.S. as being responsible for our trade problems. But, the politically strong pressures are coming from those Americans who have lost from globalization. A recent poll found that 48% of Americans believe that trade agreements have led to job losses – only 12 percent believe these agreements create jobs.
 - The U.S. will not be able to export its way out of its deficits because exports make up a small portion of the U.S. economy (11%) vs. consumption, (70%).
 - Domestic economic fissures are likely to increase as Baby Boomers start retiring during the next presidential term and place increasing demands on the national treasury forcing the necessity of entitlement reform on unwilling politicians.

- The picture painted so far is of a weakened America, confronting serious challenges, which will erode our capacity to lead. Whatever the outcome of Iraq, our military forces will have to be rebuilt at a time of severe domestic fiscal pressures.
- This leaves the next U.S. president with the challenge – if not the U.S., who? There is, quite simply, a global “authority” vacuum.
 - NATO is pushing against “out of area” limits in Afghanistan. (Somehow success in Afghanistan has become a “test” of the alliance’s viability but the possibility of failure has not had a decisive galvanizing effect.) Indeed, not only is Europe likely to turn inward to deal with its aging population but its eastern most member, Turkey, is evidencing unhappiness with the West as its European Union membership prospects diminish. It is worth noting that “Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain have cut their active duty troop levels since September 11, 2001.”(16)
 - The United Nations is circumscribed by the unwillingness of Permanent Five members to concur on decisive coercive action on issues ranging from Darfur to Iran. (What should not be lost, of course, is the huge contribution being made by the U.N. to global peace and security despite its limitations. A recent issue of the Economist noted that “some 30 million people in 50 countries are reckoned to depend on the U.N. relief agencies for their very survival.”(17) Further, the U.N. has, at present, 18 different missions with 100,000 peacekeepers deployed. It’s role in conflict management in certain regions is central.)
 - The World Trade Organization is coming up against its limits with the apparent failure of the Doha Round.
 - Fundamental reform of these and other multilateral organizations has not proceeded. Sovereignty has trumped reform. The G-8 leaves out China and India, the U.N. Permanent Five has Britain and France but not Japan, India, and Brazil. The WTO has become large and cumbersome.
- Another dilemma facing the next president is that the non-traditional agenda of security issues – which transcend borders – will be more pressing. These include – risks of a health pandemic, environmental challenges, energy security, and those using terror to achieve political ends.
 - The health challenge remains that once a serious pandemic starts it cannot be easily stopped by human action, will quickly overwhelm national health systems, and could result in massive numbers of fatalities before it runs its course.
 - The sobering release of “Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis”, by the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change lays out the basis for deep concern over the continuing build-up of greenhouse gases in our atmosphere. The U.S. with 4.6% of the world’s population emits 21% of the world’s greenhouse gas. China follows with 15% and will shortly surpass the U.S. This problem is not going away.
- This brings us to the final challenge which will be discussed at greater length in the third meeting of the working group – the capacity of the U.S. government to craft effective

policies, mobilize, and retain popular support for these policies and see to their implementation.

- The effective functioning of government is not a new challenge. After all – Petronius Arbiter, Centurion, Legions of Rome, wrote, in 210 B.C., “We trained hard. But, it seemed every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and, what a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress, while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.”
- The inter-agency process has not worked effectively in the Bush Administration, the NSC staff was not up to historical standards, and the Congress did little work to provide effective oversight. The result was a series of serious policy failures which will haunt the next administration.
- Efforts at government reform – the establishment of the DNI structure, the standing up of the Department of Homeland Security, and the transformation of the U.S. military – remain works-in-progress. The same could be said of State Department/AID reorganization efforts.

The next administration faces no greater challenge than how it organizes itself to deal with a more complex and uncertain geopolitical environment. The new administration will, regrettably, have to work with an American electorate disillusioned by the failures of their government. In this respect, the next president will be in a position similar to that faced by Ronald Reagan in January 1981.

Summary

The next American president – Republican or Democrat, male or female – will face:

- A globalized world in which the determining force may be, in columnist Tom Friedman’s words, “the technologically empowered individual.”
- A U.S. weakened and demoralized by the inconclusive wars of the first decade by the 21st century and by the collective international “push-back” to our values and policies and, critically, to our leadership.
- A sharply divided American polity lacking credible leadership at the top and national uncertainty about America’s role in the world.
- The Middle East – critical to American interests – in escalating chaos.
- New geopolitical actors, in Asia in particular, seeking to play political roles commensurate with their economic weight and prepared to challenge America’s preferred norms.

Footnotes

1. Richard Haass, "Prepared Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," January 23, 2007.
2. Charles Krauthammer, "Past the Apogee: American Under Pressure." Keynote Address at FPRI's Annual Dinner, November 14, 2006.
3. David Ignacius, "The Blair He Could Have Been," The Washington Post, January 31, 2007.
4. Marcus Walker, "Just How Good is Globalization?," The Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2007.
5. Lawrence Summers, "A Lack of Fear is a Cause for Concern," The Financial Times, December 26, 2006.
6. "The New Titans, A Survey of the World Economy," The Economist, September 2006.
7. George Packer, "Knowing the Enemy," The New Yorker, December 18, 2006, pg. 61.
8. Robert D. Kaplan, "Interventionism's Realistic Future," The Washington Post, November 22, 2006.
9. Global Economic Prospects – Managing the Next Wave of Globalization, The World Bank, 2007.
10. Rawi Abdal and Adam Segal, "Has Globalization Passed its Peak?," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007.
11. Richard Betts, "Blowtorch Bob in Baghdad," The American Interest, Summer 2006.
12. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam – A History, Penguin Books, 1984.
13. George Perkovitch, "Democratic Bomb: Failed Strategy," Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief, November 2006.
14. Poll conducted for BBC World Service by GlobeScan and PIPA, November 2006 – January 2007.
15. James K. Jackson, "Foreign Investment in U.S. Securities," CRS Report for Congress, April 24, 2006.
16. James Kitfield, "Divided We Fall," The National Journal, April 8, 2006.
17. "A Change for a Safer World," The Economist, January 6, 2006