Conflict and Security provides a framework for objective analysis of contemporary international security issues. Scholars and practitioners choose the Journal as a venue to present progressive ideas on peace and security. By examining issues such as the future role of intelligence, traditional state-to-state conflict, asymmetrical threats of terrorism, weapons proliferation and weak states, Conflict and Security is at the forefront of providing contextual analysis of the issues that will challenge states, policymakers, NGOs and the leaders of the private sector in the twenty-first century.

Issue 8.1

Gaz Promises: Russian Energy’s Challenge for the West By Keith C. Smith

Gazprom’s January 2006 cutoff of natural gas to Ukraine was a much-delayed wake-up call for Western Europe. This hostile act by Russia’s state-owned natural gas company revealed Moscow’s willingness to use its energy resources in a coercive fashion for political leverage in the region. Russian coercive energy control is an old problem for central European countries. Unfortunately, attempts by the EU’s new members to raise this issue in Western capitals have until recently been brushed aside. It is time to examine Russia’s recent sharp increases in natural gas prices and its increasing control over Europe’s gas pipeline systems. The long-term political and security significance of the Kremlin’s assertive energy policies warrants much closer study by western Europe, and certainly more cooperation with east central Europe. In arguing that western Europe needs to move quickly to reassess its relations with Russia regarding energy policy, this paper will look at overarching threats to European energy security as well as specific case studies. The first section will investigate vulnerabilities of western European countries to Russian energy coercion. The German-Russian relationship will be evaluated as a representative case. The next section will inspect the ways in which western, central and eastern Europe are in danger of becoming hostage to Russian energy policies, using the Russia-Ukraine case as a sample. The final section argues that the EU should take the lead in re-balancing the state of Russia-Europe energy relations, offering several recommendations for corrective action.

Six-Party Talks: Time for Change By Paul F. Chamberlin

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. Sun Tzu North Korea undeniably demonstrated it was the world’s ninth nuclear weapons state by testing a nuclear device on 9 October 2006. Given the measure of U.S. success in containing North Korea’s nuclear program from 1994 to 2001, the test represented a major U.S. foreign policy defeat. This defeat suggests that current U.S. policy planners neither know North Korea and regional dynamics nor are aware of their own capabilities to produce a positive outcome. Not only does the test clarify that other states lack the influence on Pyongyang that Washington had presumed, it also suggests that the U.S. approach to North Korea, including the six-party forum, requires revision. As this article was going to press, North Korea had just agreed to return to the six-party talks. The next round is envisioned for 31 December 2006. While one hopes for a successful conclusion, this essay explains why undue optimism is not warranted and recommends a new U.S. approach. It begins by reviewing key developments, including North Korea’s motives for becoming a nuclear weapons state. It then summarizes U.S. efforts to achieve its goals, including the six-party forum, and concludes with recommendations.

Countering Terrorist Financing: Lessons from Europe By Michael Jonsson and Svante Cornell

Until recently, terrorist financing has been an underdeveloped subject of academic inquiry and media reporting. With a few notable exceptions, an overwhelming majority of writing in the field followed the 9/11 attacks and focused primarily on two related questions—how al-Qaeda is financed and what can be done to disrupt their financing. Yet terrorist financing is not a new phenomenon. In Europe, both the United Kingdom and Spain have been fighting it for more than three decades. One European terrorist organization, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), has been “credited” with pioneering the kind of sophisticated financial networks that many of the world’s large and longest-lived terrorist organizations today use to sustain themselves. In spite of this, there has been little comparative research on terrorist financing. Such research is crucial to provide lessons on how best to combat terrorist organizations. This article aims to review and compare Spanish and British experiences in countering terrorist financing. The first section describes the development of more diverse and sophisticated financing methods by the IRA and ETA. The second section analyzes the interaction between different financing strategies, violent operations, and the popularity of these organizations. Following this, the cost of counter-terrorism measures to Spain and the United Kingdom is contrasted with the economic damage that has been caused to the United States by al-Qaeda. The final section points out successes and limitations of countering terrorist financing. The conclusion discusses the applicability of such methods in devising policies to combat al-Qaeda.

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