The Economic Obstacles to Democratization
By Joseph Siegle
We live in a historic era of democratic expansion. More than
half of the states that were authoritarian twenty-five years
ago have since moved toward democracy. Yet, the democratic
road is often bumpy. Of the roughly 100 countries that
have started down this path since the mid-1970s, nearly half
have experienced at least one episode of backsliding.
Seventy percent of these cases occurred during a period of
economic stagnation.1 This pattern has fueled concerns that
democratization in poor countries may be incompatible
with economic development. For many, Latin America
epitomizes the apparent tradeoff. The well-worn lament is
that, although all of Latin America, save Cuba, has moved
toward democracy and pursued free-market reforms, living
conditions in the region are worse today than they were fifteen
years ago.
The stakes for understanding the economic challenges facing
democratic transitions are high. If transitioning states cannot
sustain economic development or the strains of economic
reform prove so great that the democratic process collapses,
then the historic democratic gains we have observed are illusory.
Such a conclusion has far-reaching implications for how
vigorously industrialized democracies should support democratization
around the world.
To
begin, let's put this phenomenon in
context. Despite the disruptions involved
in reshaping the institutions of political
power, democratization is not inherently
associated with poorer social and economic
conditions. Since 1977 newly
transitioned states have averaged per
capita growth rates that are 20 percent
higher than their autocratic counterparts
at comparable income levels.2 Even
stronger divergences are observed in
indicators of social progress. Since the
end of the Cold War, democratizers have,
on average, posted infant mortality rates
that are 20 percent lower, life expectancies
that are nine years longer, and access
to safe drinking water and primary school
completion that are 15 percent greater
than countries that have not attempted to
reform politically.3
One might assume that democratizers'
superior development performance
may be attributed to populist policies
they feel compelled to pursue, which
lead to ever more dire macroeconomic straits down the line. This is not the
case. Democratizing states have achieved
their positive developmental record
without spending proportionally more
on their health and education sectors
than autocracies. Nor do they incur
higher fiscal deficits or debt loads. As
such, the economic challenges that
threaten democratizers cannot, by and
large, be attributed to the excesses of
overly generous social programs.