Czars and Company men:
The Wrong Way to Run Space Aquisitions

Eugene Gholz

The U.S. space program has always pushed the technological envelope. The military has invested enormous sums in the research, development, and procurement of satellites for intelligence gathering, communications, and navigational aid, and that investment is widely recognized as having had a tremendous payoff.

Today, space capabilities provide vital support to American power projection. The next generation of satellites, now on the drawing board, is expected to provide the underpinnings of the information technology revolution in military affairs (RMA). To support "network-centric warfare," satellites will provide communications links that constitute the network, remote sensors that improve battlespace awareness, and location information that enables precision targeting.1 But space systems are not only important to today's military because of their impact on operations. The American military leadership has also been profoundly influenced by the approach to systems development that was pioneered for space technologies. This article explains some of the pitfalls of that acquisition style, which may block some of the military's transformation plans.

Eugene Gholz is Assistant Professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and Intern- ational Commerce at the University of Kentucky, and a Research Associate for the MIT Security Studies Program.