The EU's Soft Power:
Not Hard Enough?

Jean-Yves Haine

In June 2003, at the Thessaloniki Council in Greece, the European Union approved "A Secure Europe in a Better World," the first draft of a genuine, Union-wide security strategy. For the first time, an organization of twenty-five countries agreed to set up foreign policy objectives together. European integration has created a postmodern system featuring a genuine democratic peace, an emerging institutional order, and an increasingly "amalgamated security community."1 The production of a document to tackle Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) demonstrates the nascent, yet growing, security ties between Union members. With this document, the EU comprehensively addresses both the CFSP's internal purpose and external dimension. The reasons behind this awakening are two-fold: first, the recognition after the Iraq crisis that the Union, when divided, is powerless; and second, the acknowledgment that, with the imminent official entry of ten new members, the Union cannot turn its back on the world around it.

A New America, A New Europe. For years, the United States enjoyed the recurring privilege of isolation from the tragedy of power politics. After 9/11, the United States rediscovered a real and dangerous world. George W. Bush, in contrast to his Cold War predecessors, favored a unilateralist approach to tackle the new challenge of international terrorism. This American willingness to move without the support of traditional allies precipitated the present transatlantic divide. Bush's unilateral tone and the global scope of the "war on terror" led to divergent security perceptions and interests across the Atlantic. The gap between an increasingly revisionist United States and a status quo Europe took a dramatic turn with Iraq, and deeply cut across Europe as member states were discussing a new draft of the constitution aimed at bringing more cohesion to European affairs, including foreign policy.2

Unlike the United States, which cited disarmament and potential links to terrorism as the strategic motives behind their objective of regime change, most Europeans focused on current capabilities and disregarded past behavior when analyzing the threat posed by Iraq.3 Consequently, they did not support regime change by force. Precisely because Iraq was a war of choice, not of necessity, and because victory was preordained, the subject of debate evolved rapidly from this particular circumstance to a discussion on general principles, from Saddam's disarmament to Washington's use of force, from the opportunity for a second UN resolution to the relevance of the UN itself, and from a specific demand of assistance by Turkey to NATO's raison d'être.

This represented too high a challenge for the EU.

Jean-Yves Haine is Research Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies. He is writing this article in his personal capacity.