Adam Mount

Doctoral candidate in Government at Georgetown University;
 Primary fields: international theory and security.
  Specific interests include collective agency and action theory, global justice theory, American hegemony, political time

c.v.; sdf fb; last.fm last.fm email ajm84 @ georgetown.edu; The International Interest

Policy

The Autonomy Rule
Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, March 2009. (with Charles Kupchan)
 •  Summary in the Washington Post;
 •  Video + mp3 of panel on the subject at the New America Foundation.


Academic Working Papers

State Agency as Reflexive Reason
•  12,685 words; 4 August, 2009

Abstract: To rectify a persistent deficiency in constructivist theory, a theory of state agency is presented herein. The argument proceeds along increasing levels of social aggregation. Concepts of personal agency from philosophical and social theory debates develop theoretical standards and a vocabulary; applying these insights to collective agency requires innovations to establish the possibility of shared intention, endogenous identity, and political persuasion; reflexive agency is described on a national level by contrast with concepts of state personhood. Where reflexivity for individuals is a personal and psychological process, national agency is a political process.

doc Misunderestimation: Explaining U.S. Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs
•  (With Alexander H. Montgomery, Reed College). 12,470 words; draft of 25 May, 2010
                for the Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation project at King's College, London
               + appendix

Abstract: Various policy options have been proposed for slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons; yet all rely on sound intelligence about the progress of nuclear aspirants. Historically, the United States has had an uneven record of estimating weapons programs, overestimating the progress made by some proliferators while underestimating others. This paper seeks to catalogue and evaluate the intelligence work surrounding sixteen of the twenty-five states that are thought to have pursued nuclear weapons and to derive conclusions about the causes of distorted nuclear proliferation intelligence estimations. In particular, we evaluate twelve specific hypotheses related to policy, culture, bureaucracy, and organizational culture. We find that the US has overestimated nuclear programs more frequently than it has underestimated or correctly estimated them, and that most mistaken estimates founder on similar grounds.