
Policy
Doctoral candidate in Government at Georgetown University;
Primary fields: international theory and security.
Specific interests include collective agency and action theory, global justice theory, American hegemony, political time
c.v.;
fb;
last.fm
ajm84 @ georgetown.edu;
The International Interest
The Autonomy Rule
Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, March 2009. (with Charles Kupchan)
• Summary in the Washington Post;
• Video + mp3 of panel on the subject at the New America Foundation.
Academic Working Papers
Abstract: To rectify a persistent deficiency in constructivist theory, a theory of state agency is presented herein. The argument proceeds along increasing levels of social aggregation. Concepts of personal agency from philosophical and social theory debates develop theoretical standards and a vocabulary; applying these insights to collective agency requires innovations to establish the possibility of shared intention, endogenous identity, and political persuasion; reflexive agency is described on a national level by contrast with concepts of state personhood. Where reflexivity for individuals is a personal and psychological process, national agency is a political process.
Misunderestimation: Explaining U.S. Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs
• (With Alexander H. Montgomery, Reed College). 12,470 words; draft of 25 May, 2010
for the Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation project at King's College, London
+ appendix
Abstract: Various policy options have been proposed for slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons; yet all rely on sound intelligence about the progress of nuclear aspirants. Historically, the United States has had an uneven record of estimating weapons programs, overestimating the progress made by some proliferators while underestimating others. This paper seeks to catalogue and evaluate the intelligence work surrounding sixteen of the twenty-five states that are thought to have pursued nuclear weapons and to derive conclusions about the causes of distorted nuclear proliferation intelligence estimations. In particular, we evaluate twelve specific hypotheses related to policy, culture, bureaucracy, and organizational culture. We find that the US has overestimated nuclear programs more frequently than it has underestimated or correctly estimated them, and that most mistaken estimates founder on similar grounds.
Abstract: The basic problem of political theory is to properly conceive of relations between entities at different levels of aggregation. This paper aims to develop a groundwork typology for classifying different forms of such relations. Drawing on developments in the philosophy of science, aggregation, supervenience, and emergence are developed as exclusive and exhaustive types that are shown to pertain to social phenomena of all types, whether rationalist or ideational. These developments are demonstrated with respect to differing conceptions of the higher-level property sovereignty that from the state formation literature.
The Moral Agency of States
• 5,700 words; draft of 25 June, 2008
Abstract: If we are to finally confront the problem of global poverty, who should we expect to act?
Because of the enormity of the task of constructing even a minimally just world, it seems reasonable to suppose that one of the requirements for the designation of moral agents in international politics is that of clarity and therefore parsimony. To avoid confusion and establish real responsibility, we should, if possible, locate moral agents of last resort to whom we can point decisively and expect to act. I will argue below that with the help of insights agent-structure theorists in social and international theory, we can meet this requirement by producing a general definition of moral agency. This is then tested against various proposals for agents from global justice theory to see which can best satisfy the definition offered.