Abstract: To rectify a persistent deficiency in constructivist theory, a theory of state agency is presented herein. The argument proceeds along increasing levels of social aggregation. Concepts of personal agency from philosophical and social theory debates develop theoretical standards and a vocabulary; applying these insights to collective agency requires innovations to establish the possibility of shared intention, endogenous identity, and political persuasion; reflexive agency is described on a national level by contrast with concepts of state personhood. Where reflexivity for individuals is a personal and psychological process, national agency is a political process.

Abstract: The basic problem of political theory is to properly conceive of relations between entities at different levels of aggregation. This paper aims to develop a groundwork typology for classifying different forms of such relations. Drawing on developments in the philosophy of science, aggregation, supervenience, and emergence are developed as exclusive and exhaustive types that are shown to pertain to social phenomena of all types, whether rationalist or ideational. These developments are demonstrated with respect to differing conceptions of the higher-level property sovereignty that from the state formation literature.

Abstract: If we are to finally confront the problem of global poverty, who should we expect to act? Because of the enormity of the task of constructing even a minimally just world, it seems reasonable to suppose that one of the requirements for the designation of moral agents in international politics is that of clarity and therefore parsimony. To avoid confusion and establish real responsibility, we should, if possible, locate moral agents of last resort to whom we can point decisively and expect to act. I will argue below that with the help of insights agent-structure theorists in social and international theory, we can meet this requirement by producing a general definition of moral agency. This is then tested against various proposals for agents from global justice theory to see which can best satisfy the definition offered.

Abstract: Many policy options have been proposed for slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons; yet all rely on sound intelligence on the progress of nuclear aspirants. Historically, the United States has had an uneven record of estimating weapons programs, overestimating the progress that some proliferators have made, while underestimating others. A comparative historical cataloging and evaluation of intelligence failures on nuclear weapons can therefore contribute major insights to public policy. This paper seeks to detail the circumstances and intelligence work surrounding sixteen of the twenty-five states that are thought to have attempted to develop nuclear weapons and derive conclusions about the political causes of distorted nuclear intelligence estimations. In particular, we evaluate specific hypotheses related to policy, culture, organizations, and institutions. We find that the US has overestimated much more frequently than it has underestimated or correctly estimated states’ programs, and that this is primarily due to policy-related causes rather than culture.